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amount of competent evidence which bears on the preliminary question. There-
after a short supplemental voir dire hearing might be sufficient to insure that
the exclusionary rules were being applied in the light of the pertinent facts.
Such a solution would, of course, require trial courts to be alert both to the
existence of a coincidence between preliminary fact and ultimate issue, and the
underlying question posed by such a coincidence. The cases unfortunately
suggest that the problem is often ignored, and sometimes misunderstood, by
the courts.
LIMITATIONS ON SEIZURE OF "EVIDENTIARY" OBJECTS
A RULE IN SEARCH OF A REASON
"Significant but confusing" appropriately describes the rule first enunciated
in 1921 in Gouled v. United States' that objects of "evidentiary value only" can
never be seized even though an otherwise valid search warrant has been issued
for the objects and a properly conducted search has taken place.2 In the Gouled
case some bills for legal services, an executed contract and an unexecuted con-
tract were seized under a valid search warrant by federal agents while investi-
gating alleged use of the mails to defraud the United States. The Supreme Court
held, on the evidence presented, that these objects were of "evidential value" a
only and accordingly immune from seizure; their seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment and the use of them in evidence violated the Fifth Amendment. 4
I
For several reasons the Gouled rule is significant. First, the rule, originating
in the Supreme Court, has retained its vitality by frequent application in the
lower federal courts.5 Even a few state courts have utilized the rule, although
1 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
2 Of course, it is possible to conduct a valid search incident to arrest without a search war-
rant. The cases indicate that the scope of seizure incident to arrest may vary somewhat from
the scope under a search warrant. See, e.g., Sayers v. United States, 2 F. 2d 146 (C.A. 9th,
1924).
3 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921). 4 Ibid.
6 Cases in which the court suppressed the evidence: United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp.
765 (N.D. Cal., 1951) (Gouled cited); Freeman v. United States, 160 F. 2d 72 (C.A. 9th,
1947) (Gouled not cited); United States v. Chodak, 68 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md., 1946) (Gouled
not cited); In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 2d, 1945) (Gouled cited); United States v.
Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. W.Va., 1944) (Gouled cited); Takahashi v. United States,
143 F. 2d 118 (C.A. 9th, 1944) (Gouled cited); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y., 1943) (Gouled not cited); United States v. Thomson, 11,3 F. 2d 643
(C.A. 7th, 1940) (Gouled cited); United States v. Genello, 10 F. Supp. 751 (M.D. Pa., 1935)
(Gouled cited); Bushouse v. United States, 67 F. 2d 843 (C.A. 6th, 1933) (Gouled cited); United
States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (C.A. 2d, 1930) (Gouled not cited); United States v. Kirschen-
blatt, 16 F. 2d 202 (C.A. 2d, 1926) (Gouled cited); United States v. Snow, 9 F. 2d 978 (D.
Mass., 1925) (in setting the case for further hearing, court distinguished between evidentiary
and nonevidentiary materials and expressed view that evidentiary materials cannot be
seized; Gouled cited); In re No. 191 Front Street, 5 F. 2d 282 (C.A. 2d, 1924) (Gouled cited);
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by far the greater majority of states are silent on the question.6 Second, the
federal doctrine that evidence taken in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments must be suppressed requires the exclusion of this "evidentiary only"
material.7 Such exclusion may mean the difference between the successful prose-
cution of a defendant and the complete collapse of the prosecution's case. The
exclusion of the bills and contracts in the Gouled case, for example, caused the
prosecution's case against Gouled to fail. Third, the rule purports to provide
some guide to government agents as to what can and cannot be seized. Fourth,
there is a bare possibility that the Gouled rule is essential to a scheme of "or-
dered liberty," thus making it a part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and binding upon all the states. The Supreme Court has not yet
tested this proposition, although it held in Wolf v. Colorado8 that the federal
exclusionary rule is not essential to due process.
There is uncertainty, however, both as to what objects are "evidentiary
only" and as to the underlying rationale for the rule itself. An address book was
termed a "fruit" of a crime in Matthews v. Correa9 whereas in United States v.
-Lerner"0 the court classified a similar book as being "merely evidentiary." In
both cases the search was incident to arrest. The defendant in the Lerner case
was charged with harboring a fugitive while the defendant in the Matthews case
Honeycutt v. United States, 277 Fed. 939 (C.A. 4th, 1921) (Gouled cited). Cases in which the
court admitted the evidence: United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass., 1948) (Gouled
cited); United States v. Lindenfield, 142 F. 2d 829 (C.A. 2d, 1944) (Gouled cited); Matthews
v. Correa, 135 F. 2d 534 (C.A. 2d, 1943) (Gouled not cited); United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp.
986 (S.D. Cal., 1943) (Gouled cited); Landau v. United States Att'y for So. Dist., 82 F. 2d
285 (C.A. 2d, 1926) (Gouled cited); Foley v. United States, 64 F. 2d 1 (C.A. 5th, 1933) (Gouled
cited); Sayers v. United States, 2 F. 2d 146 (C.A. 9th, 1924) (Gouled cited).
Although most of these cases differed somewhat from Gouled in their fact situations, the
Gouled rule has been used to distinguish between objects that can and cannot be seized.
Several of the cases cited involved searches incident to arrest and in some both the seizure
and the manner of search were unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp.
765 (N.D. Cal., 1951), where bills, statements, photographs, a telephone list and several addi-
tional objects were taken. Not only were the objects "merely evidentiary" but the search was
exploratory. Although a case precisely like Gouled has not been before the Supreme Court
since the Gouled case, the Gouled rule has influenced the Supreme Court in their decisions as
to the limits to seizure. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
6 State v. Willard, 54 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Sup. Ct., 1951). Here a search warrant authorized a
county officer to seize private books and records "for use as evidence before the... Grand
Jury and in any prosecutions following." The defendant's books were seized and an indictment
returned against him. The court held the seizure was objectionable on grounds of self-incrimi-
nation. See also statement in Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d 164 (1942), favorable to
the Gouled rule; State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 (1924).
7See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Under the Silverthorne doctrine, if it is objectionable to obtain
the objects by warrant, the government is further prohibited from using these objects to
obtain other incriminating evidence against the defendant.
9 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
' 135 F. 2d 534 (C.A. 2d, 1943). 10 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal., 1951).
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was charged with concealing money, merchandise and other property from her
trustee in bankruptcy. The Matthews court, in its explanation of the character
of the address book, made a statement that clarifies little: "The line between
fruit of the crime itself and mere evidence thereof may be narrow; perhaps this
turns more on the good faith of the search than the actual distinction between
the matters turned up."" An exemplification of further confusion attending the
application of the rule is Zap v. United States. 2 Here a cancelled check that had
been used to defraud the government was seized during an inspection of the
defendant's books by federal agents. According to the majority opinion, the
check was the means by which the crime was committed and therefore subject
to seizure." The opinion of the dissenting judges indicates their belief that the
check was merely evidentiary,14 and thus, under the authority of the Gouled
case, immune from seizure. But, the dissenting opinion seems to agree with the
majority that a valid warrant could have been issued for the cancelled check, a
statement wholly inconsistent with the Gouled rule. 5
The difficulty of drawing a consistent line between those objects that are
"evidentiary only" and those that may be seized is further indicated by a com-
parison of Marron v. United States,6 Gouled v. United States 7 and United States
v. Lefkowitz.' 8 In the Marron case, government agents discovered the defendant
in the act of soliciting illegal liquor business. An arrest followed. Under a war-
rant authorizing a search for "intoxicating liquors and articles for their manu-
facture," ledgers and bills were seized by the arresting officers. The court held
that the ledgers were "part of the outfit ... actually used to commit the of-
fense" and the bills "were so closely related to the business [that they could be
"1135 F. 2d 534, 537 (C.A. 2d, 1943). In the Matthews case, the court held that the search
was not too intense, even though a thorough search of drawers and other parts of the house
was conducted. It is interesting to conjecture that the size of the objects searched for may have
importance in deciding whether an intensive search is necessary. For example, an intensive
search may be essential to discover small objects like money in the Matthews case while a
similar search for a still in open view as in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)
may be objectionable. For additional analysis of this point see Ramsey, Acquisition of Evidence
By Search and Seizure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1137, 1153 (1947). The officers in the Matthews case
searched for money and merchandise and were allowed to seize an address book and an account
book. The Supreme Court has developed a number of categories of seizable objects as dis-
tinguished from evidentiary materials. These categories include instruments of a crime, fruits
of a crime, weapons used to commit a crime, contraband and stolen goods. See Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1946).
1328 U.S. 624 (1946).
3 Ibid., at 629 n. 7.
4 Ibid., at 632-33. Frankfurter states, "But to seize for evidentiary use papers the posses-
sion of which involves no infringement of law, is a horse of a different color."
5 Ibid. See Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 Indiana LJ. 259, 283 (1950), where the author takes the position
that the Zap case should have followed Gouled v. United States.
16 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
17 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Is 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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considered] as used to carry it on."'" Any difference between the bills for legal
services seized in the Gouled case and the bills seized in Marron is slight. A
reasonable conclusion to draw is that the two cases are inconsistent insofar as
the limitations upon the objects seized are concerned." In United States v.
Lefkowitz, federal agents conducted a search incident to an arrest for conspiracy
to sell and possess intoxicating liquors in violation of the Prohibition Act. A
number of papers, books, glasses, liquor and other articles were picked up by the
searching officers. The Court described the search as "exploratory" and called
the objects "unoffending" and immune from seizure. Some of these objects do
not seem to differ to any significant extent from the bills seized in the Marron
case.
Thus the Gouled rule as interpreted by the courts leaves no hard and fast
test upon which federal agents can rely.
II
What rationale, if any, have the courts employed to determine the limits to
seizure, i.e., the reason for the Gouled rule? In most instances, the courts have
accepted the Gouled rule upon faith or have neglected to make explicit the
reasons for applying the rule. The Gouled court, itself, did not elaborate on the
reasons for creating such a distinction. At first glance, it seems surprising that,
in cases where there has been a lawfully conducted search and the evidence
19 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
20 Lasson points out the inconsistency between the Gouled, Lefkowitz and Marron cases.
Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution 135-36 (1937). Many cases can be cited demonstrating the fuzzy line between evi-
dentiary and other objects. Landau v. United States Att'y for So. Dist., 82 F. 2d 285 (C.A. 2d,
1936), involved a memorandum containing a list of watches the defendant was planning to
smuggle in from Switzerland. The court held the memorandum to be not merely evidentiary
but an instrument of the crime. The court declared, "If papers can ever be an instrumentality
of crime, when not constituting the essence of the crime itself, they are such here." In Bus-
house v. United States, 67 F. 2d 843 (C.A. 6th, 1933) notebooks, receipts, correspondence,
records and other items were seized under a warrant for "liquors, materials and ingredients
designed and intended for use in the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and books and
memoranda disclosing sales of and miscellaneous dealings in such liquors." The court held
that the books, etc. were seized merely as evidence of the defendant's complicity in a viola-
tion of the Prohibition Act. A case decided a little earlier held under practically similar cir-
cumstances that such books, records and ledgers were the things actually used to commit the
crime of conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act. Foley v. United States, 64 F. 2d 1 (C.A.
5th, 1933). United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (C.A. 2d, 1930) is another example of the
court's classification of certain books containing entries of transactions as evidentiary in a
case involving prohibition violations. For additional authority as to the uncertainty regarding
what constitutes evidentiary materials, consult In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 2d, 1945)
(securities and cash seized where charge was accepting a bribe; held evidentiary); Bozel v.
Hudspeth, 126 F. 2d 585 (C.A. 10th, 1942) (papers, circulars, advertising matter seized inci-
dent to arrest where charge was mail fraud; held fruits); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks
Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. N.Y., 1943) (books, papers and records seized where charge was
making defective hand grenades; held evidentiary); Sayers v. United States, 2 F. 2d 146
(C.A. 9th, 1924) (liquor, meat bill, light bill, record of savings and of beer purchases seized
in search incident to arrest on charge of prohibition violation; seizure held reasonable)."
secured is relevant to the crime charged, the courts have applied an additional
limitation as to objects that can and cannot be seized.2'
It is arguable that the invalidation of a seizure of evidentiary objects turns on
the stake or "title" the possessor has in the objects. The operation of this "title"
notion is more clearly evident when the courts decide that other categories of
objects can be seized. Stolen property has long been recognized as subject to
seizure." In an early case, the seizure of stolen property was justified on the
ground that the thief has no property rights in the goods.23 Lord Camden de-
clared in Entick v. Carringto, 24 the most famous English case of seizure: "Papers
are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so far
from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection." As for con-
traband25 and public papers,2 both of which the courts agree can be seized, title
to neither is in the possessor. It should be noted here that the "stake" the indi-
vidual must have in the object before he can protest the seizure is somewhat
greater than is required to enable him to bring an action of trespass to chattels,
in which case mere possession may be sufficient.
The title rationale, however, is insufficient to explain the seizure of weapons
used to commit a crime27 and of required records. Not only does the individual
have possession of the weapons, but title as well, which according to the "title"
rationale should permit him to protest the seizure. Similarly, while required
2There is no express language in the Fourth Amendment to support such a limitation. It
can be argued, however, that some distinction between objects that can and cannot be seized
was intended by the drafters since they included the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures" in the Amendment. (Emphasis added.) It is doubtful that a conclusive decision as to
the validity of the limitation can be made on the basis of an interpretation of the language of
the Amendment. In any event, it is significant that none of the cases have attempted to justify
the Gouled rule on this ground.
2 Rule 41(b) Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 18 U.S.C.A. (1951), authorized the seizure of stolen
property. In the historical development of the Fourth Amendment, Coke in England main-
tained that even stolen property could not be seized. Coke, Fourth Institute 176 (1797). But
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765), the court mentioned that by
common practice stolen property had become subject to seizure. See also, United States v.
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947), and
the cases cited, at 154 n. 7 for approval of this formulation.
23 Statement to this effect can be found in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1066 (1765).
2I Ibid.
2" For a complete list of federal statutes authorizing a seizure of contraband consult the
Appendix to Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 618 (1946). A few examples will serve to illus-
trate what contraband can be seized. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (still);
United States v. Hotchkiss, 60 F. Supp. 405 (D.C. Md., 1945) (still); Symons v. United States,
178 F. 2d 615 (C.A. 9th, 1949) (dope); McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) (liquor).
2 The Supreme Court upheld the seizure of ration coupons in Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 588 (1946), and of draft classification cards in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 154 (1946), on the ground that these items were "government property" subject to in-
spection and recall at any time.
2 7 Rule 41(b) Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 18 U.S.C.A. (1951), authorizes the seizure of weap-
ons used to commit a crime.
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records can be seized,28 title nevertheless remains in the defendant. Further-
more, there are no convincing arguments in favor of treating the "title" ration-
ale with such high regard. Making such a notion decisive where the entrance
upon the premises is already authorized under the warrant is a somewhat un-
expected bit of caution. 29 In addition, this doctrine would supply no reliable
guide to searching officers in deciding, for example, whether a piece of paper is
evidentiary only or a means used to commit a crime.
Courts frequently hold that the Fifth Amendment's clause forbidding com-
pulsory self-incrimination is violated by a seizure of evidentiary objects.2 This
self-incrimination hypothesis had its inception in Boyd v. United States.A and
received confirmation in the Gouled case. In the Boyd case, a court order, in
compliance with a federal statute, directed the defendant to produce an invoice.
The order stipulated that if he failed to produce the invoice the allegations per-
taining to it would be treated as admitted.32 It was held that the order was both
an invasion of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the equiva-
lent of self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth.33 The Fifth Amendment vi-
olation lay in the compulsion which this particular statute imposed upon the
defendant to produce the object. The defendant was confronted with the diffi-
cult choice of either producing the invoice or having the allegations pertaining
to it admitted. The discussion in the Boyd case has given rise to a doctrine re-
quiring symmetry between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments which has re-
28 United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Iowa, 1945), held that the Fourth
Amendment is not applicable to records kept by a person under the requirement of law. The
court called the records quasi-public since they are open to inspection at all times. However,
incident to arrest a stock record book was held not subject to seizure because it did not consti-
tute an instrumentality of the crime. Freeman v. United States, 160 F. 2d 72 (C.A. 9th, 1947).
The court admitted the quasi-public nature of the documents but maintained that they were
mere evidence of the crime. The court nevertheless declared that such documents could have
been picked up under a search warrant or subpoena. The Supreme Court has not yet passed
upon the seizability of required records.
29 Furthermore, courts applying the Gouled rule do not speak in terms of "title" or "tres-
pass." However, the Gouled court may have had some title-trespass notions in mind when it
declared that warrants must be limited to cases where "a primary right to such search and
seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it." (Emphasis added.) Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298,309 (1921).
31 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932).
31116 U.S. 616 (1886).
-Ibid., at 620.
3 Ibid., at 635. Thus by judicial interpretation, the Fifth Amendment's protection against
self-incrimination was engrafted on the Fourth Amendment to the point where evidence
taken in violation of the Fifth also violates the unreasonable seizure clause of the Fourth
Amendment. Wigmore argues that the histories of the two amendments have been distinct
and that different considerations should govern the interpretation of each. 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2264(2b) (3d ed., 1940).
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sulted in comment that the effective protection of the individual from self-
incrimination is responsible for the Gculed rule.3 4
To test this hypothesis, first the categories of objects to which the privilege
applies must be examined. The privilege against self-incrimination is primarily
a protection against testimonial compulsion,35 but the privilege has been ex-
tended to the category of pre-existing documents. 6 A completely acceptable
justification for this extension has not been offered, the best suggestion being
that an individual should not be forced to choose between perjury and destruc-
tion of the papers.37 This difficult choice is absent in the seizure field when
stolen goods and contraband are involved, since the thief or possessor need not
vouch for the genuineness of the goods. The rightful owner is the logical party
to make such authentication and therefore no violation of the privilege is ap-
parent. Furthermore, the possession of such objects is tainted with illegality
from the beginning. 38
Where weapons used to commit a crime are seized,39 none of the usual justi-
fications for applying the self-incrimination privilege are present: there is no
testimonial compulsion, and there is no "impossible" choice for the possessor to
make. Thus the courts are in accord that the seizure of such weapons is valid,
although the question of whether the Fifth Amendment is violated has never
been explicitly decided in relation to these objects. 40
Public papers and required records appear to be treated like corporate papers
insofar as the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in-
crimination is relevant. The privilege is denied the possessor of such papers.
4
Apparently objects of evidentiary value only are similar to the pre-existing
document category that enjoys immunity from production. But the justification
for allowing the privilege to pre-existing documents does not hold when a seizure
34 In his dissent in Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595 (1946), Justice Frankfurter
declared, "Private papers of an accused cannot be seized even through legal process because
their use would violate the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination."
Also see Machen, The Law of Search and Seizure 42 (1950); United States v. Richmond, 57 F.
Supp. 903, 907 (S.D. W.Va., 1944).
35 Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (C.A. 7th, 1920). See Meltzer, Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 700 (1951).
-Ibid., at 699.
37 Ibid., at 692. 38 Ibid., at 707 n. 100.
3g For a well-known declaration to the effect that weapons can be seized, see Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
40 If a subpoena for such objects were issued, however, the possessor would be faced with
the "impossible" choice of either producing an object that might incriminate him or de-
stroying it in disobedience to subpoena. In this event, the courts would be faced with the
necessity of making an express ruling on the applicability of the Fifth Amendment. However,
as a practical matter, it seems doubtful that a case in which such weapons are subpoenaed
will ever occur.
Consult Meltzer, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 687, 701
(1951).
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occurs because there is no opportunity for the possessor to destroy the objects,
and consequently, no "impossible" choice for him to make. One might argue
that the "lazy prosecutor" notion, sometimes used to explain the privilege
against self-incrimination, would supply a clue as to the reason for the immunity
of evidentiary objects from seizure. But it seems an overextension of this notion
to compel the prosecutor to exercise more ingenuity in discovering other kinds
of proof when he has already taken the time to procure a search warrant and to
conduct a search. Thus there seems no convincing reason for treating the seizure
of evidentiary objects as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
If Fifth Amendment notions control whenever the Gouled rule applies, it
should be the case that corporations cannot claim the benefit of the Gouled rule.
Broad powers of subpoena are allowed with respect to corporations.4 In Okla-
homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,4" the Court placed few restrictions on the
subpoena of corporation papers by a government administrative agency:
"[T]he Fourth [Amendment], if applicable, at the most guards against abuse
only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be
'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is au-
thorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant." 44 The Court
stated in United States v. Morton Sall Co.45 that a request for reports and other
information by a regulatory commission is valid even though the investigation
has no particular charge in mind and is conducted merely to satisfy "official
curiosity.1 4 This type of investigation is hardly distinguishable from a search
for "evidence." Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly asserted that
corporations are denied the benefit of the Gouled rule, the cases in result sub-
stantiate this position.47 The above discussion indicates that it is possible to line
42 Most cases agree that as long as the subpoena does not call for all the corporation's
books and the documents are relevant to the investigation, the subpoena will usually be up-
held. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 72-73 (1906); McGarry v. SEC, 147 F. 2d 389 (C.A. 10th, 1945); Fleming v.Mont-
gomery Ward & C6., 114 F. 2d 384 (C.A. 7th, 1940).
43 327 U.S. 186 (1946). 45338 U.S. 632 (1950).
44 Ibid., at 208. 46 Ibid., at 652.
47 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923), was a case in which the corporations
were subpoenaed to produce certain books and records. The records were produced and sub-
sequently two individuals in the corporation were arrested on the grounds of carrying on illegal
importations. The corporation brought a writ of error to review the action of the District
Court in denying the corporation the return of the papers. It was contended that the Boyd and
Gouled cases required the return,but the court held: "Those cases [Boyd and Gouled] were all un-
reasonable searches of documents and records belonging to individuals. The distinction between
the cases before us and those cases lies in the more limited application of the Amendments to
the compulsory production of corporate papers and documents." Ibid., at 158. Reynard seems
to think that the corporation cases are consistent with the Gouled rule because the records
could be used to commit further crimes. Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and
Seizure-A Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 Indiana LJ. 259, 288 (1950). But when
no charge is made against the defendant prior to the subpoena, why isn't a search found
to be for "evidence" in the Gouled sense when the documents are called for?
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up most of the seizure cases on a Fifth Amendment rationale.48 However, as we
have seen, the rationale is tenuous when applied to the seizure of evidentiary
objects.
A privacy rationale may provide a better explanation of the Gouled rule.
Privacy is already protected to an extent through Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of the unreasonable search clause of the Constitution.49 But the safeguards
of a reasonable search apply mainly to the original entry. It is arguable that the
drafters of the Constitution intended to further protect a man's privacy by
immunizing from seizure certain of his personal property. The Constitution
explicitly distinguishes between houses, papers and effects.8" A good statement of
the privacy rationale is found in United States v. Poller." "[T]he real evil aimed
at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's
privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence
against him.... Nevertheless, limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to
limit the quest itself." 2
The protection of privacy provides a fairly good justification for the distinc-
tion between objects that can and cannot be seized. In the case of stolen goods
and contraband which can be seized, the individual's right to privacy does not
appear worthy of protection because (1) the individual does not own the prop-
erty, and (2) his acquisition or possession of it is illegal. There is no need to
protect privacy where public papers and required records are concerned, since
both categories of objects are by definition open to inspection at all times. One
might maintain that where privacy notions prevail weapons could not be seized.
But, as to these items, there is another equally if not more important policy to
consider. The courts have concluded, and rightly so, that it is better to incon-
venience an individual somewhat by the seizure of his weapons than to allow
the individual the use of these dangerous instruments to harm the public and to
perpetrate further crimes.
Seizure in sedition cases raises problems that a privacy rationale for the
Gouled rule may help in solving. It can be said with some positiveness that the
"evidentiary only" rule originated in Entick v. Carrington,5 where so-called
4 8 This self-incrimination notion cannot explain the seizure of the cancelled check in Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). Is not the check a pre-existing document?
49 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1926).
0 "[T]he rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. Amend. 4.
8143 F. 2d 911 (C.A. 2d, 1930).
52 Ibid., at 914. The court in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202 (C.A. 2d, 1926),
explained the Gouled rule on a privacy basis. It was said that unless a limitation is placed on
objects that can be seized, one could search at random. Dax, Arrest, Search and Seizure 144
(1946), cites Kirschenblatt as authority on the matter. Other sources also indicate that the
privacy notion is dominant. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest
Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 623-24 (8th ed., 1927); U.S.
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 64 (1950).
63 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
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"seditious" papers were seized. Concern was expressed in the Enlick case be-
cause a warrant had been issued authorizing the seizure of seditious materials.
The court argued that if an officer were allowed to procure such a warrant, there
was imminent danger that he would search and seize objects indiscriminately."
Search for evidence to convict the defendant was held to be repugnant to the
ideals of personal security and privacy. The Fourth Amendment was probably
designed to remedy such indiscriminate seizure." Even though it is far from
clear what materials are seditious (and it would be asking a great deal for
federal agents to be proficient in sifting seditious materials from harmless ob-
jects) nevertheless, to protect one's security, it is essential that some limit be
placed on the scope of seizure. The District Court decision in United States v.
Bell" points up the importance of this issue. Following a lawful search incident
to arrest, the defendant was indicted for conspiring to violate the Espionage
Act. Large quantities of letters, printed literature, documents, pamphlets and
other papers were seized. Many of the articles were not directly related to the
commission of the crime charged; yet the court upheld the seizure on the
grounds that the crime was of a complicated nature and that incident to arrest
there may be seized "articles, books, and papers which are the instruments,
fruits or evidence of the crime or connected with its commission or which supply
proof relating to the transaction out of which it arose."5' 7 It seems distressing
that in time of national hysteria, seizures of "seditious" materials might be per-
mitted that would effectively obliterate the concept of unreasonable seizures.
Were privacy notions dominant under the Gouled rule, one would expect to find
the rule applied most rigorously in cases involving sedition. However, the fact
that the Smith Act permits warrants to be issued for material advocating violent
overthrow of the government 5 indicates that privacy notions have been sub-
ordinated in an effort to preserve national security. If the Communist Mani-
festo or a pamphlet describing the merits of the communal farm system is
seditious matter which can be picked up with a warrant under the Smith Act,
then one can argue that few objects are safe from seizure.
Another difficulty with the privacy notion as an explanation of the seizure
cases is the fact that, in instances where privacy needs protection most, the
54 The Star Chamber and Privy Council in 1596 allowed searches for all books and papers
that affect the state. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution 26 n. 50 (1937). An example of the consequences of such seizures
is related ibid., at 31. The Privy Council authorized a search of Edward Coke's home for
"seditious and dangerous papers." All his books, jewelry, money and even a will were seized.
" See Lasson, op. cit. supra note 54.
56 48 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Cal., 1943). 7 Ibid., at 995.
5" 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951). The statute declares
that it is "unlawful for any person... to print, publish ... circulate... or publicly display
any written'or printed matter advocating, advising or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability,
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence."
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Supreme Court has failed to give the essential help. Securing evidence by wire-
tapping and other modem hearing devices has been held not to violate the
Fourth Amendment. 9 While deciding that evidence procured through the em-
ployment of a hearing device cleverly concealed in the clothing of a federal
agent's accomplice did not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, the
Court in On Lee v. United Staese0 postulated that the rule granting immunity
from seizure to materials of "evidentiary value only" applies only to a seizure.of
"tangible" objects.8 ' In other words, a taking of conversations, words or
thoughts is not really a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. This rule seems to run contrary to the dictum of a District Court in
Reeve v. Howe62 that intangible objects such as communications as well as tangi-
ble objects are "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Court appears to have conveniently forgotten that one's security can
be disturbed equally as much by a seizure of "words" as by a seizure of "docu-
ments." Furthermore, it is peculiar that the Supreme Court did not hold, as-
suming that there had been a seizure, that wiretapping and the acquisition of
evidence through other modem hearing devices is a seizure of materials of
"evidentiary value only" and consequently invalid. For, in the usual instance,
there is probably nothing more purely evidentiary than an intercepted con-
versation. If privacy protection were the most important consideration in any
application of the Gouled rule, it should be found that the rule at least covers
the wiretapping situations.6
Some cases apply a rule to the seizure problem under which all evidence that
is relevant to the crime charged is admitted. 4 Such a rule, of course, would
eliminate the Gouled doctrine. Under this relevancy rule the searching officer
can determine the limits to a valid seizure more easily than he can under the
Gouled rule. When the Goled rule is in effect, an officer may never know what
the court will regard as "evidentiary only." However, despite the simplicity and
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretapping); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (detectaphone).
60 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
1t Ibid., at 753. 6233 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Pa., 1940).
' Another suggested rationale for the Gouled rule is that the rule is necessary to prevent
prosecutions from being based on opinion evidence, i.e., letters and diaries. Fraenkel, Recent
Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 Iowa L. Rev. 472, 488 (1948).
This rationale is predicated on the rather weak assumptions that (1) prosecutors will prosecute
in cases in which they have little substantial evidence, and (2) judges are incapable of discern-
ing between opinion evidence and non-opinion evidence. None of the reported cases indicate
that this rationale is the moving force behind the rule.
64 See In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 2d, 1945), where the test was relevancy. See
also United States v. Mounday, 208 Fed. 186 (D. Kans., 1913). A law review notewriter, dis-
cussing the Gouled rule, asks: "Is it a wholly irrational interpretation of the language of the
court to say that the public has a very real interest in the discovery, seizure and use of every-
thing which may tend to establish guilt of crime?" 20 Mich. L. Rev. 93, 95 (1921). Wisconsin
allows the seizure of evidence of a crime. Wisc. Stat. § 363.02 (10) (1951).
19531 COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
easy comprehensibility of the relevancy doctrine, there remains a conscious
feeling that additional safeguards to one's privacy are requisite.
Perhaps the extension of the Gouled rule into the field of wiretapping and
other secretive hearing devices would be desirable. It is in this field that safe-
guards to the search are lacking, there being no necessity for obtaining search
warrants. A more rigorous application of the rule in the sedition area may also
be advisable. But shortcomings to this rule may render any application ineffec-
tive, because the rule leaves officers in the dark as far as knowledge of the pre-
cise limits to seizure is concerned. There exists the additional question of wheth-
er such a judicial rule would have any real deterrent effect upon law enforce-
ment officers. In addition to these two practical objections to the extension of'
the rule into other areas, there is the further objection that the Gouled rule lacks
an acceptable rationale. But this objection is not necessarily decisive. As Justice
Learned Hand has said, "Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances,
real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go par passu with
the supposed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth and tough-
ness of their roots in the past."85
COMMUNISTS AND THE RIGHT TO BAIL
The usually tranquil law of bail has been recently disturbed by a surprising
number of cases illustrating the sharp test put to civil liberties conceptions by
the Communist problem. Proceedings against subversives under the Smith
Act' and the Internal Security Act of 19502 have brought variations in previous-
ly routine and unquestioned bail procedures. Within the bail framework, consti-
tutional values and practical possibilities of martyrdom compete with concern
for the security of the nation. The haven offered by sympathetic foreign govern-
ments and the nature of the international Communist conspiracy seem to pro-
mote escape.3 The government's challenge of the traditional rules of bail has
raised difficult problems of policy and justice.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the response of the federal
courts to these considerations in four situations regarding bail: (1) prior to con-
viction; (2) pending appeal; (3) in deportation proceedings; and (4) in examin-
ing the qualifications of a proffered surety.4
11 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C.A. 2d, 1926).
154 Stat. 670 (1940), as amended, 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. 2385 (1951).
2 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (Subversives Activities Control Act of 1950; the McCarran Act).
3 Gerhardt Eisler jumped bail and was, until his recent removal from office, an important
official in the East German government. As stated in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951),
"The government asks the courts to depart from the norm by assuming, without intro-
duction of evidence, that each petitioner is a pawn in a conspiracy and will, in obedience to a
superior, flee the jurisdiction." But compare the reception of the same argument when ad-
vanced in a deportation proceeding.
4 In relating the cases, it may be helpful to keep in mind the following sequence of events
which have seemed to tighten the government's case: outbreak of Korean hostilities, June 25,
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